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Equality Rights and
Social Benefit Programs
D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C.*
I. AUTON: WHAT DID IT DECIDE?
In Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General),1 our courts faced a perfect storm created by colliding social, political, and legal forces. Socially, the families of children affected by
autism have been engaged for a decade in lobbying and litigation to
extend public funding for intensive behavioural therapy for their children. Politically, lobbying efforts have strained the capacity of existing
government programs, hovered uneasily in policy territory that is both
health and education and involves substantial unforeseen costs. Legally,
families affected by this disorder refused to accept that government
could decide whether or not to fund behavioural therapy and at what
level. In their view, they had the same right to public funding for treatment of their children’s illness as families facing childhood cancer.
The end result of the litigation in Canada was a case described by
the Supreme Court as “the first case of this type to reach this Court”.2 It
was so described because in the view of the Supreme Court, the unanimous findings in the lower court had been built upon an incorrect premise that the provincial medicare scheme conferred a statutory right to
public funding for all medically necessary services. The Supreme Court
concluded to the contrary that the medicare scheme created a publicly
funded insurance health plan with universal access to partial coverage
defined broadly by reference to services provided by medical practitioners and hospitals. The Court concluded that outside these core medical
services, the statute had granted administrative discretion as to whether
to extend public funding for treatments such as intensive behavioural
therapy or other professional disciplines such as behavioural therapy.
*
1
2

Partner with Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, in Vancouver, British Columbia.
[2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2004 SCC 78.
Id., at para. 47.
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The Court went on to consider whether the petitioners were wrongly
excluded from funding under the statute as properly construed.
The Court found that the petitioners’ central objection related to the
delay in responding to reasonable demands for intensive behavourial
therapy for funding for autistic children and in limiting that funding on
financial and other grounds.
The Court concluded that the proper comparator group had to be established in relation to the executive or administrative consideration of
extending the system to cover a non-core therapy rather than the extent
of coverage for more conventional treatments:
People receiving well-established non-core therapies are not in the
same position as people claiming relatively new non-core benefits.
Funding may be legitimately denied or delayed because of uncertainty
about a program and administrative difficulties related to its
recognition and implementation. This has nothing to do with the
alleged ground of discrimination. It follows that comparison with
those receiving established therapies is inapt.3

In the result, the Court concluded that there was no denial of a benefit on an enumerated or analogous ground since there was no evidence
suggesting the government’s approach to ABA/IBI therapy was different than its approach to other comparable non-core therapies for nondisabled persons or persons with a different type of disability.4
In the result, the Court found it unnecessary to deal with whether the
element of discrimination could have been said to exist on the facts, but
reaffirmed that this would have been a necessary analysis in any such
consideration.5
The perfect storm surrounding Auton6 raises the more general question of the intersection of equality rights and the development and administration of social programs. What room is there for an equality
analysis in relation to these policy areas? In what respects must a legislature be sensitive to its obligations to extend equal benefit of the law
and to avoid discrimination in the definition and delivery of these programs? How is the fact that the law provides for a social benefit rather

3
4
5
6

Id., at para. 55.
Id., at paras. 58-62.
Id., at para. 63.
Id.
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than a definition of a general legal right or obligation significant for an
equality analysis?
In this paper, I address some of the criticisms made of the result and
reasoning in Auton.7 I then address briefly the results and reasoning in
other social benefit cases. That analysis suggests that the Court does not
have a fixed approach to equality claims which arise in the context of
social benefit programs. Rather, as in Auton,8 the Court appears consistently to prefer a more narrowly legal means of resolving the disputes
rather than employing general questions of social policy and considering
how equality analysis may facilitate or interfere with identified social
objectives. In essence, the equality discussion is about making certain
types of distinction impermissible. To the extent that the decided cases
indicate a trend, the Court appears to have little hesitation when it is
convinced that the use of the distinction in its context is arbitrary and
unfair. Certainly, the result in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),9
argued the day before the Auton10 case, belies the concern that the Court
has become unduly timid in its approach to the Charter.11

II. OBJECTIONS TO AUTON
The criticisms expressed respecting the Auton12 decision can be
summarized as follows:
1. A Retreat to Formal Equality
It has been said the lower courts reviewed the facts in the spirit of
substantive equality and did not let legal structures interfere with the
conclusion that the government decisions in the case were discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning on this view is an

7

Id.
Id.
9
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35.
10
Supra, note 1.
11
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
12
Supra, note 1. These criticisms have been extracted by me from public comments, discussions with other practitioners and the expressed concerns at various meetings held to discuss
ramifications of the judgment.
8

96

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

approach that is formal and does not address the underlying reality of
the case.
2. Comparator Group of Choice
The Court’s selection of the comparator group that differed from
that proposed by the petitioners is said to signal a retreat from the
Court’s previous injunctions to view the question of discrimination and
the proper comparator from the perspective of the claimants with the
result that the government’s viewpoint is given undue weight.
3. It’s All About Money
In the build-up and publicity surrounding the Auton13 appeal, the
fear was expressed that the scale of the moneys involved, and the fiscal
impact on funding for other disabilities had an artificial and illegitimate
(if invisible) influence on the Court’s judgment. I consider each of these
criticisms in turn.
(a) Formal Equality
In the context of this debate, the phrase “formal equality” runs the
risk of being used in only a pejorative and not descriptive sense. Finding
the absence of a legal right to the benefit claimed does not constitute a
refusal to go beyond the formal categories established by the statute.
The remarkable aspect of this criticism is that it fails to have regard
to the fact that neither the respondents nor the intervenors in support of
the judgments below argued with any force that the interpretation of the
Medicare Protection Act14 adopted in the British Columbia courts was
correct. Both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal opinions expressly founded their view of the equality issues upon the conclusion that the
right involved was funding for a medically necessary service within a
universally funded medicare system.15 Neither court below addressed the
13

Supra, note 1.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 286.
15
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Minister of Health), [2000] B.C.J.
No. 1547, 2000 BCSC 1142, at paras. 87-109, affd Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2002] B.C.J. No. 2258, 2002 BCCA 538, at paras. 37-39.
14
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fact that the concept of universality in both the Canada Health Act16 and
as referred to in the Medicare Protection Act17 refers to the access by
insured persons to the publicly funded medicare system rather than the
scope of services and medical procedures made available by the system
itself. Rather, as held by the Supreme Court, both the Canada Health
Act18 and the Medicare Protection Act19 consider the scope of services a
question of comprehensiveness which in turn is defined by reference to
the professions and institutions (principally doctors and hospitals) which
make up Canada’s medicare system.
(b) Comparator Group
The criticism that the Court failed to pay sufficient deference to the
petitioner’s selection of a comparator group depends in part on the
proper view of the statutory structure. The comparator group proposed
by the petitioners and adopted in the lower courts of children suffering
from other illnesses or mentally handicapped adults disregarded the
differences drawn by the statutory scheme between insured and uninsured therapies. In my view, the court has properly reaffirmed the overall principle that the legal structure and context of a comparative
equality analysis is framed by the legislature and the relevant law.
What is unclear from the reasons is whether the relative recency of
behavioural therapy was only of historical significance or had a more
wide-ranging impact on the analysis. The statutes, of course, distinguish
between insured and uninsured therapies. Chiropractic care has been
shuffled in and out of the medicare system throughout its modern history, but is not recent. Nonetheless, it represents a therapy and service
outside of the core of insured benefits. It is possible that a welldeveloped and established therapy might justify a different comparator
group in reviewing the governmental decision to deny or otherwise
ration access to the therapy. The Court has made it clear, nevertheless,
that in such case the claimants would nevertheless have to prove the
remaining element of discrimination:

16
17
18
19

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6.
Supra, note 14.
Supra, note 16.
Supra, note 14.
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[I]t would still be necessary to examine whether the distinction was
discriminatory in the sense of treating autistic children as second-class
citizens and denying their fundamental human dignity. 20

There seems little doubt that the British Columbia courts were
strongly influenced by the dramatic needs of the claimant families. Here
was a therapy which offered the prospect of improvement to children’s
lives, but which was costly and out of reach of the financial means of
most Canadians. Further, it appears that the utility of this treatment is
diminished or lost unless a child receives it in the first few years of
diagnosis and for that reason the familiar delays of government in evaluating, preparing, and receiving approval for funding a new program
were particularly upsetting to the affected families. Certainly, it should
also be said that the atmosphere within which the utility of therapies for
autistic children has been debated has become extraordinarily polarized.
Some advocates of Lovaas therapy appear to regard almost any professional or governmental criticism of that therapy as rooted in ignorance
and morally repugnant. However understandable, the charged atmosphere presented challenges for litigants, the counsel and the courts.
(c) Fiscal Consequences
The orders made in the British Columbia courts certainly presented
a vivid example of social policy and social expenditures being dictated
by the courts. However, the question of the fiscal significance of the
orders below is not referred to in the Court’s reasoning. The character of
the administrative and legislative decision as to the scope of coverage
under the provincially funded medicare scheme is referred to for its
legal and not social policy significance. Given the tenor of submissions
by government and intervenors alike, the Court’s silence on the issues is
clearly deliberate.
In my respectful view, the argument that the result in Auton21 flowed
invisibly from the concerns about the financial significance of the results below are in part rooted in an oversimplification of the government’s position. In a case involving much smaller amounts at stake, Mr.
Justice Lambert in the Court of Appeal in Eldridge v. British Columbia
20
21

Supra, note 1, at para. 63.
Supra, note 1.

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Equality Rights and Social Benefit Programs

99

(Attorney General)22 would have disallowed the constitutional claims in
that case under section 1 of the Charter23 on the basis that the allocation
of health-care funding raised intractable problems that were incompatible with judicial decision-making. Thus, there are reasoned arguments
which flow from the character of social policy decisions, and not from
the scale of particular fiscal impacts.

III. WAS THERE DISCRIMINATION?
The Court concluded that it was able to dismiss the constitutional
claims without addressing whether the claimants could have established
the element of discrimination if they had been unable to overcome the
first two obstacles to their claims.24
Although this may well have been judicially prudent, the reasons in
the courts below raised very interesting issues concerning the inference
of discrimination in cases involving disability. Madam Justice Allan at
trial had concluded that this was an instance of direct discrimination
because the refusal to fund behavioural therapy in light of the evidence
of its effectiveness could be only explained by a conclusion that autism
was refractory and not amenable to treatment — a conclusion, which in
her view, must have flowed from a stereotype about children suffering
from autism. In the Court of Appeal, Saunders J.A. agreed, but added
the further observation that the refusal to fund therapy acted to create a
socially constructed handicap for these children.
Certainly these conclusions were amongst the most interesting in a
very interesting case. The trial judge’s reasons gave rise to the question
of whether responsiveness to treatment is a legally relevant feature of
disability just like its other characteristics, i.e., inability to walk, inability to see, etc. Does a reluctance to acknowledge progress in treatment
necessarily disclose a discriminatory motive or effect? If it may do so,
when is it suspect and when does it reflect an honest disagreement over
priorities or the results of treatment? Is an honestly held difference over
the efficacy of treatment and the terms of delivery a foundation or an
obstacle to a discrimination claim?
22
[1995] B.C.J. No. 1168, 7 B.C.L.R. (3d) 156 (C.A.), revd [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 624.
23
Supra, note 11.
24
Supra, note 1, at para. 63.
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There is no doubt that obtaining public funding for a relatively costfree therapy is vastly easier than introducing one which involves substantial cost, unorthodox treatment, and a new category of health care or
educational providers. In the Auton25 case, this controversy was somewhat heightened by the fact that the claim was to the families’ treatment
of choice and a particular behavioural therapy. Indeed, one of the features of what has come to be known as the “autism wars” is a highly
charged atmosphere within which professionals who subscribe to the
Lovaas approach are at odds with those who consider it a promising, but
not exclusive approach to autistic therapy.26
The Court of Appeal’s application of the concept of a “socially constructed handicap” is also interesting and challenging. Since it is a characteristic of autism that those suffering from it have difficulty engaging
with other people and the main goal of all therapies is to require them to
engage with the world, a failure of treatment may well result in a socially isolated and severely handicapped individual. Whether there is any
logical distinction between withholding therapy and withholding funds
for therapy, there can be little doubt that the outcome of the availability
of therapy is important to the families of those suffering with autism. Is
this, however, a “socially constructed handicap”?

IV. ARE SOCIAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS TREATED DIFFERENTLY?
The civil rights movement originated from concern over laws respecting fundamental issues of capacity and access. Thus, the common
right to be free of any laws sustaining slavery arose from a fundamental
conviction about the equal sovereignty and dignity of persons.27 Similar
civil rights claims relating to gender and sexual orientation easily fit
within the same tradition, even where they concern equal access to social facilities or general statutory rights or programs.
The seminal decision of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia28 concerned the equal capacity of landed immigrants and citizens to
act as lawyers.
25

Supra, note 1.
Susan Sheehan, “The Autism Fight”, New Yorker; 79:37 (1 December 2003) 76, 12p, 1c.
27
Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves (Houghton Mifflin, 2005).
28
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
26
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It is worth observing, however, that the defences in these various
cases have all tended to flow from a sense of social principle. The institution of slavery was connected with a way of life and particular economy which was threatened by abolition.29 The “peculiar institution” of
segregation in the American South had deep-seated social roots, which
flowed from the conviction that there were real (even if unreasoned)
differences between blacks and whites which justified separate schools,
separate washrooms and the like.30 Certainly the differences between
landed immigrants and citizens were regarded by the governments of the
day as more than justifying the exclusion of non-citizens from qualifying to practice law.
Given this conference is, in part, dedicated to the 20th anniversary
of the coming into force of the equality provisions, it is worth recalling
that the Attorney General of British Columbia’s fundamental justification for the statutory exclusion of non-citizens was one of political philosophy: since lawyers played an important role in the legal system, and
since laws are enacted by elected representatives who are accountable
only to citizens, it is, therefore, only reasonable to restrict membership
in the legal profession to citizens despite the ability of non-citizens to
prove themselves otherwise qualified to practise law.
It is easy to forget how fervently this view was held only two decades ago. Indeed, after the restriction was struck down in the British
Columbia Court of Appeal the initial reaction by the Law Society of
British Columbia was to immediately ask for a special sitting of a fivejudge panel to review the correctness of the reasons of McLachlin J.A.,
as she then was. Indeed, the Law Society and the Attorney General of
British Columbia felt so strongly about the case that they asked for the
co-operation of Mr. Andrews’ for the substitution of another petitioner
so that the appeal would not become moot upon him being called to the
Bar under the force of the Court of Appeal order,31 or upon becoming a
citizen.
Ultimately, in my view, the result in Andrews32 was the product of a
fundamental conclusion that the citizenship requirement was more sym-

29

Supra, note 27.
James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its
Troubled Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
31
Elizabeth Kinersly.
32
Supra, note 28.
30
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bol than substance and did not have a foundation in any real difference
between landed immigrants and Canadian citizens.
However viewed, the history of civil rights establishes that justifications based on social values may well be suspect and social understandings can and do operate as proxies for deliberate discrimination.
There is, however, also a sense in which some social and economic
choices have qualities which are not amenable to the judicial method.
There are some cases in which the character of the statutory benefit and
the underlying social choice appears to have influenced the outcome. In
Law v. Canada,33 the differential impact was based on age in the context
of survivors benefits provided under the Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”).
The CPP then reduced survivors’ pensions for able-bodied surviving
spouses without children such that the threshold age to receive benefits
was 35 and that full benefits were only received at 45 and older. Although as we all know, the Court pronounced a unanimous decision and
exhaustively restated the factors for analysis of discrimination claims,
the Court upheld the use of an age-based standard to distinguish between potential claimants and their need for long-term income replacement. Indeed, the Court held that the clear ameliorative purpose of the
pension scheme for older surviving spouses was a factor supporting the
view that the CPP provisions do not violate essential human dignity.
The Court found that Parliament is entitled to premise remedial legislation upon informed generalizations without running afoul of section
15(1) of the Charter34 and being required to justify its position under
section 1. The fact that younger persons had not had a history of exclusion and stereotyping supported the view that the statute’s refusal to
condition benefits on individual circumstances rather than categories of
age was not discrimination.
A similar analysis was conducted in McKinney v. University of
Guelph35 in the context of a challenge to the mandatory retirement policy within universities. In the context of assessing whether the mandatory retirement rule minimally impaired the rights of capable older

33
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
34
Supra, note 11.
35
[1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at paras. 67-68.
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faculty, the Court referred back to the reasoning in Irwin Toy36 as follows:
Minimal Impairment
In assessing proportionality and particularly the issue whether
there has been a minimal impairment to a constitutionally guaranteed
right, it must be remembered that we are concerned here with
measures that attempt to strike a balance between the claims of
legitimate but competing social values. In the case of broadly based
social measures like these, where government seeks to mediate
between competing groups, it is by no means easy to determine with
precision where the balance is to be struck. As the majority of this
Court observed in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra,
at p. 993:
“Thus, in matching means to ends and asking whether rights
or freedoms are impaired as little as possible, a legislature
mediating between the claims of competing groups will be forced
to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute certainty
concerning how that balance is best struck.”
The approach taken to these cases has been marked by
considerable flexibility having regard to the difficulty of the choices,
their impact on different sectors of society and the inherent advantages
in a democratic society of the legislature in assessing these matters.

In Lovelace v. Ontario,37 at the end of its analysis, the Court found
that the exclusion of non-registered Aboriginal communities from a
distribution of casino revenues flowed from the exercise of the province’s constitutional spending power and did not by that exclusion impair the “Indianness” of the non-registered communities.
The Court’s determination to decide these cases on bases other than
judicial deference is also evidenced by the results in Nova Scotia
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’
Compensation Board) v. Laseur38 and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of

36
37
38

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at paras. 110-11.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504.
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Employment and Immigration).39 In Granovsky, the Court held that the
differential drop-out provisions available to applicants who suffered
from severe and permanent disabilities would not be subject to a comparison with persons who suffered recurring, but not permanent disability. Again, the Court found that there was no convincing human rights
dimension to the complaint. The Court found that in framing subsidy
programs, Parliament is called upon to target groups and that in doing
so, drawing lines is an unavoidable feature. The Court declined to find
that a legislative distinction as between groups of similarly disabled
persons with respect to the qualification for public social programs was
amenable to a discrimination analysis.
In Martin,40 on the other hand, the Court took a very different view
of a blanket exclusion from a benefits program on the basis of a selected
disability. Justice Gonthier for the entire Court, found clear discrimination in the following reasoning:
By entirely excluding chronic pain from the application of the general
compensation provisions of the Act and limiting the applicable
benefits to a four-week Functional Restoration Program for workers
injured after February 1, 1996, the Act and the FRP Regulations
clearly impose differential treatment upon injured workers suffering
from chronic pain on the basis of the nature of their physical disability,
an enumerated ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter. In the context of
the Act, and given the nature of chronic pain, this differential
treatment is discriminatory. It is discriminatory because it does not
correspond to the actual needs and circumstances of injured workers
suffering from chronic pain, who are deprived of any individual
assessment of their needs and circumstances. Such workers are,
instead, subject to uniform, limited benefits based on their presumed
characteristics as a group. The scheme also ignores the needs of those
workers who, despite treatment, remain permanently disabled by
chronic pain. Nothing indicates that the scheme is aimed at improving
the circumstances of a more disadvantaged group, or that the interests
affected are merely economic or otherwise minor. On the contrary, the
denial of the reality of the pain suffered by the affected workers
reinforces widespread negative assumptions held by employers,
compensation officials and some members of the medical profession,

39
40

[2003] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703.
Supra, note 38.
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and demeans the essential human dignity of chronic pain sufferers.
The challenged provisions clearly violate s. 15(1) of the Charter.41

With respect to justification under section 1, Gonthier J.A.
acknowledged the relevance of budgetary considerations as it related to
deference to governmental choices. However, the blanket exclusion of
people who would otherwise qualify for the benefits was found to place
it outside of any acceptable concept of minimal impairment. In Eldridge,42 Lambert J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded that the general
framework set out by Oakes43 was unduly restrictive when the court had
to consider a discrimination claim which intersected with the polycentric nature of policy relating to social program benefits. His reasoning
was as follows:
There is a national debate underway at the moment about the
reduction of funds to be transferred from Canada to the Provinces in
the future for Health, for Welfare, and for Education. There is a debate
underway in each Province about the expenditure priorities for the
reduced funds. In the allocation of scarce financial resources each
Province will be required to make choices about spending priorities.
Will medical equipment be bought for city hospitals or for small rural
hospitals? Will the health care services in remote communities or in
First Nations communities be improved? Is the best form of
expenditure to raise the scale of payment for doctors and other health
care workers? Should improved public facilities be provided for
detection of cervical cancer, prostate cancer or breast tumours?
Some of the limits imposed under the Medical and Health Care
Services Act and some of the financial allocation choices that I have
mentioned have resulted and will result in adverse effects
discrimination against people suffering from disabilities, including
serious illness itself. But we do not have those cases before us. How
can we say, in those circumstances, that expenditure of scarce
resources on services that remedy infringed constitutional rights under
s. 15, on the one hand, are more desirable than expenditures of scarce
resources on things that cure people without affecting constitutional
rights, on the other. And, indeed, how can we prefer the allocation of

41
42
43

Id., at para. 5.
Supra, note 22, at paras. 57-59 (C.A.).
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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scarce resources to services that remedy the infringed constitutional
rights of one disadvantaged group over the allocation of scarce
resources to services that remedy the infringed constitutional rights of
a different disadvantaged group.
In my opinion the kind of adverse effects discrimination which I
consider has occurred in this case should be rectified, if at all, by
legislative or administrative action and not by judicial action. The
evidence in this case disclosed that legislative or administrative action
in relation to medical services for deaf people is being evaluated and
considered. That evaluation and consideration can take into account
many matters which were not in evidence before us. In those
circumstances I have concluded that this is a case for judicial restraint
and for deference under the Constitution and under s. 1 of the Charter
to legislative policy and administrative expertise.

In the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that the application
of the Oakes test requires close attention to context and that where the
legislature is balancing competing interests and is engaged in social
policy, the application of Oakes must be applied flexibly. In particular,
the Court observed that social benefits often have to select between
disadvantaged groups and the distribution of resources in society as an
exercise that must be given wide latitude. Hearkening back to the
boundary between licence and review, the Court reaffirmed the observation in Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration
Commission)44 that a court would not give any government unlimited
licence in disregarding Charter45 rights and that a reasonable basis had to
be demonstrated for concluding that the legislation had sought to minimally impair the Charter46 right at issue. On the evidence before the Court
in that case, the estimated cost of providing sign language translators for
the whole of British Columbia was only $150,000 or approximately 0.25
per cent of the budget.
However, the Court concluded in Eldridge47 (as in Martin48 and
Tetreault-Gadoury)49 that the blanket denial of benefits made it impossi-

44
45
46
47

624.

[1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22.
Supra, note 11.
Id.
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
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ble to characterize a governmental decision as one which was the product of balancing competing social demands.
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.50 is an interesting example of the
Court expressing social policy in support of a discrimination claim when
it concluded that imposing the cost of procreation upon women when
only women can become pregnant when all in society benefited from
procreation was discriminatory and unfair. Although not a Charter case,
it was clear that the selection of pregnancy as a special state of health
for the purposes of a disability or leave plan ran contrary to the view
that “pregnancy is no different from any other health-related reason for
absence from the work place”.51
There are some occasions where legislative decisions during the
course of litigation makes it clear that there is no real debate concerning
an arbitrary legislative distinction. Schachter v. Canada52 concerned
leave benefits to adoptive fathers. Pending the appeal, the Act was
amended to extend the same benefits to adoptive and natural fathers.
Development of work-fare programs for welfare dependent individuals was the social policy context for Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney
General).53 That decision has been more closely reviewed elsewhere by
Professor Cameron in Positive Obligations Under Sections 15 and 7
Under the Charter: Comment on Gosselin v. Quebec.54 For present purposes, however, the inferred social policy as between the majority of
five and the dissenting judges is sharply at odds. Indeed, the majority
went so far as to find that the denial of equal benefits to welfare recipients under 30 coupled with training and work programs affirmed the
dignity and human worth of younger welfare recipients. Justice
Bastarache in dissent noted that the record established that it was not in
fact easier for persons under 30 to obtain jobs as opposed to their elders.
Accordingly, he held that the distinction embodying the statute was
based on a stereotypical view that young welfare recipients are better off

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Supra, note 38.
Supra, note 44.
[1989] S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
Id., at 1237-38, para. 28.
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
[2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.
20 S.C.L.R. (2d) at 65.
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than older recipients and that the old assumptions regarding the employability of young people no longer apply.

V. CONCLUSION
There appears to be no obvious direction, either of deference or interference, based upon the character of the underlying statutory program
at issue.
However, the ascertainment of the underlying social policy embodied in the statutory provision certainly appears to be central to the conceptual landscape for any section 15 analysis.
The factual record in respect of social programs appears to have an
unpredictable impact upon the reasoning. Thus, for example, the majority in Gosselin55 appears to have reflected a majority view respecting the
interests of younger welfare recipients which the dissent believed was
based on outdated and stereotypical views which did not accord with the
evidence in the record. In Auton,56 the claimants unsuccessfully argued
that proof of utility was conclusive evidence of discriminatory effect.
It is perhaps noteworthy that in both Auton57 and the earlier decision
of Tétreault-Gadoury,58 the Court decided that preliminary conditions
did not exist for the raising of a legitimate section 15 claim.
In the context of the overall jurisprudence of the Court, the outcome
in Auton59 is not surprising. The Court’s careful assessment of the statutory context in which the claim was brought is a salutary reminder that
the benefit or disadvantage imposed by the law is the starting point for
all section 15 cases. For government, of course, the definition of statutory programs becomes of great importance. At the same time, the Court’s
decisions certainly support the view that blanket exclusions from otherwise universal programs will be carefully reviewed and struck down
even where there may be a rational basis for the distinction. A government’s plea that it must perform a balancing act between societal and
individual interests clearly has resonance with the Court and has done
for the last 20 years: however, it will not be allowed to be used as a
55
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disguise for irrational and arbitrary rejection of the right of an individual
to equal benefit and protection under the law.

